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Business Information and "Personal
Data": Some Common-Law Observations
About the ED Draft Data Protection
Directive *
James R Maxeiner**

This Comment originated from an interview in early 1992 with
Professor Joel Reidenberg, one of the two featured speakers of the second
session of this symposium regarding U.S. privacy practices, on his study of
American Data Protection Law for the European Union (EU). We
discussed an earlier draft of legislation that would later become the
Common Position adopted by the EU Council with a view to adopting
Directive 951 IEC of the European Parliament and Councii on the
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data
and on the Free Movement of Such Datal (Draft Directive), which provides for regulation of private in addition to governmental processing of
"personal data."
.Article 2(a) of the Directive defines personal data as "any information
relating to an identified or identifiable natural person ('data suqject')."
This broad definition seems to encompass as personal data even an
incidental notation about the chief executive officer of a corporation in a
privately commissioned business information report regarding that
corporation. For example, it appears to reach a report on Microsoft
Corporation that includes the statement that "William H. Gates, III, born
1955, was cofounder of the business in 1975, has been active there since,
and is Chairman of the board and CEO."

*
**

© James R. Maxeiner, 1995. All rights reseIVed.
J.D., LL.M., Dr.Jur. (Munich). Vice President and Associate General Counsel, Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. The views expressed are the author's and not necessarily those of Dun &
Bradstreet. Translations without attribution are the author's.
1. This article was written as a response to the Commission of the European
Communities' "Amended proposal for a Council Directive on the protection of individuals
with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data" of
October 15, 1992, 1992 OJ. (C311/30) 35 [hereinafter 1992 Commission Draft]. Only after
this article was completed and edited did the Council publish its Common Position, 1995 OJ.
(C 93) 1 [hereinafter Draft Directive], the text of which is reprinted in Appendix A of this
issue of the Iowa Law Review. While 'references to the 1992 Commission Draft have been
updated to the Council's Draft Directive and are all current, it has not been possible to fully
revise this article to take complete account of the changes made by the Council. Some of the
issues discussed here under the 1995 Council Draft Directive are discussed in James R.
Maxeiner, Freedom of Information and the EU Council Draft Directive, 47 Fed. Comm. LJ.
_ (forthcoming, Fall 1995).
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The title of this symposium is Information Privacy and the Public
Interest The public interest is not served by privacy safeguards alone. The
public interest also calls for an open and free flow of information. In
business transactions generally, in both common-law and civil-law jurisdictions, affirmative duties to disclose pertinent information frequently exist2
American securities laws, for example, impose obligations to disclose.
More broadly, businesses present themselves to the public to do
business with the public. The public, when it deals with a business,
justifIably wants to know basic facts about the people behind the business.
Typically the public wants to know such facts as: (1) the owners of the
business; (2) the business-related background and experience of the
owners; and (3) the business-related background and experience of the
principal managers.
Thus, information about business persons may be as much business
data as personal data. These data are reported incidental to data on the
business. They are used in connection with business decisions. They
frequently are drawn from public record sources. The business, rather than
the individual, bears the brunt of adverse consequences derived from these
data. In view of the business focus, rather than the personal focus of these
data, as well as the strong interest of the public in having access to these
data, rules designed to protect persons who are only consumers may have
to be tempered when applied to persons involved in business. There are
few people who would argue that persons who present their businesses to
the public should be permitted to remain anonymous or be allowed to
control public comment on their business activities.
Business information providers want to know what accommodation
the EU will make for the public interest in a free flow of information about
data subjects involved in business. They want to know to what extent the
EU will protect the freedom of all members of society to collect and
disseminate information.
This Comment uses a common-law, comparative perspective to
examine the Draft Directive's treatment of business information involving
individual data subjects. Its goal is limited to issue-raising; it does not attempt a comprehensive review of these issues. Part I of this Comment
examines the common-law treatment of data protection.!! Part II analyzes
the defInition of "personal data" in the EU Draft Directive.4 Part III
discusses the regulatory aspect of the Draft Directive and the Draft
5
Directive's protection of freedom to collect and disseminate information.

2. See generally Nicola W. Palmieri, Good Faith Disclosures Required DUring
Precontractual Negotiations, 24 Seton Hall L. Rev. 70 (1993) (discussing disclosure requirements for business transactions under U.s., Italian, and German law).
3. See Infra notes 644 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 45-68 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 69-103 and accompanying text.
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1. COMMON-LAW PERSPECTIVE
The two featured speakers of the U.S. portion of the Symposium,
Professors]oel Reidenberg and Paul Schwartz, have criticized American
data protection law. Professor Reidenberg has pointed out that "the
American legal system responds incoherently and incompletely to the
privacy issues raised by existing information processing activities in the
business community."6 He hasabserved that no generaRy applkable data
protection law exists in the United States. Professor Reidenberg has concluded that "[b]ecause privacy rights in the United States for commercial
information processing depend on legislation targeted at narrow problems
and rather limited common law rights, the lack of a coherent and systematic approach to existing privacy concerns presents an undesirable
policy void."' Professor Schwartz has written of "The Failure of the
American Legal Response to the Computer."8 Professor Schwartz has
complained that in the United States "[t]here is still no constitutional right
adequate to protect the individual in the information age." 9 Both
Professors Reidenberg and Schwartz have advocated that the United States
learn from European experiences.10 Professor Schwartz has lauded the
German Constitutional Court for avoiding reliance on notions of privacy
and confidentiality and accepting "the social nature of information and
calling for measures to structure the handling of personal data."Il
Professors Reidenberg and Schwartz are correct Common law privacy
rights do not provide systematic protection. But common-law experiences
still offer something. If a benefit of civil-law methods is a coherent
approach to problems coupled with systematic legislation to implement
solutions,12 a virtue of common-law methods is a case-by-case working out
6. Joel R Reidenberg, Privacy in the Information Economy: A Fortress or Frontier for
Individual Rights?, 44 Fed. Comm. LJ. 195, 199 (1992). Probably the most important of these
sectoral laws is the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681a to 168lt (1988), which,
however, applies generally only to "consumer reporting agenc[ies)." Id. § 1681a(f).
7. Reidenberg, supra note 6, at 236.
8. Paul M. Schwartz, Data Processing and Government Administration: The Failure of
the American Legal Response to the Computer, 43 Hastings LJ. 1321 (1992).
9. Paul M. Schwartz, The Computer in German and American Constitutional Law:
Towards an American Right of Informational Se1f:.Determination, 37 Am. J. Compo L 675, 694
(1989). In writing this Comment, I did not have the benefit of either Professor Reidenberg's
or Professor Schwartz's remarks at the Symposium.
10. See, e.g., Reidenberg, supra note 6, at 237 ("Other ways of addressing these concerns
in different countries may offer illustrative guidance for United States policy."); Schwartz, supra note 9, at 686 ("The American Supreme Court's deficient idea of constitutional data
protection law can be contrasted with the more successful principles articulated by the
German Constitutional Court."); see also Joel R Reidenberg, The Privacy Obstacle Course:
Hurdling Barriers to Transnational Fmancial Services, 60 Fordham L Rev. S137, S141-60
(1992).
11. Schwartz, supra note 9, at 690.
12. SeeJames R Maxeiner, Policy and Methods in German and American Antitrust Law: A
Comparative Study 27-31 (1986) [hereinafter Maxeiner, Policy and Methods] (presenting a
general discussion of common law methods); James R Maxeiner, 1992: High TIme for
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of clashes of competing interests. As discussed below, IS the EU Draft
Directive has developed from a systematic approach to legislation
concerned primarily with regulation of governmental data collection
activities. It has given less comprehensive treatment to interests of the
public in a free flow of information. Experiences of other jurisdictions that
have paid closer attention to these interests may be useful.
Common-law privacy rights developed with acute awareness of the
interest in freedom of information collection and dissemination. In
IWberson v. IWchester Folding Box Co., 14 one of the first American privacy
cases, and one more hostile to privacy rights than most, the New York
Court of Appeals rejected the claim that unauthorized use of a person's
likeness on a flour package supported a claim for damages. 15 The Court
considered the claim too great a restriction on third party comment on
neighbors' activities:
The so-called "right of privacy" is, as the phrase suggests, founded
upon the claim that a man has the right to pass through this
world, if he wills, without having his picture published, his
business enterprises discussed, his successful experiments written
up for the benefit of others, or his eccentricities commented
upon either in handbills, circulars, catalogues, periodicals, or
newspapers; and, necessarily, that the things which may not be
written and published of him must not be spoken of him bl his
neighbors, whether the coiiunent be favorable or otheIWise.1
The court's hostility toward a common-law right of privacy led the New
York State Legislature to adopt a statutory right of privacy. That right
remains in effect to this day, although it is a limited rather than a general
right of privacy.17
Common-law privacy rights are not intended to be a response to
privacy issues raised by commercial information processing activities
generally. They hardly could be. They mandate no affirmative obligations,
such as obligations of notification, data quality, information subject access,
or security. At most, common-law privacy rights impose limited constraints
on distribution of information. Because common-law methods address
privacy issues on a case-by-case basis, they are not suited! to developing a
general regimen of data protection. The IWberson court held the view that
there is an "absolute impossibility of dealing with this subject save by
legislative enactment, by which may be drawn arbitrary distinctions which
no court should promulgate as part of general jurisprudence." 18

American Lawyers to Learn from Europe, or Roscoe Pound's 1906 Address Revisited, 15
Fordham Int'l 1..J. 1, 12 (1991) [hereinafter Maxeiner, Roscoe Pound's Address] (quoting
Pound for the proposition that "we have no true system of the common law, much less a system of the law that actually governs").
13. See infra text accompanying notes 61-103.
14. 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902).
15. Id. at 442.
16. Id. at 443.
17. N.Y. Civ. Rights Law §§ 50-52 (Consol. 1976).
18. Robmon, 64 N.E. at 447. One is overly optimistic to expect a systematic law from the
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Courts and commentators typically separate common-law privacy
rights into four types: (1) intrusion; (2) public disclosure of private facts;
(3) false light in the public eye; and (4) appropriation. 19 Collectively,
these rights constitute the "right of each individual to be let alone."2O
"Intrusion" requires an intentional infringement "upon the solitude or
seclusion of another or his private affirirs."21 A third party does not violate
this right if the personal information is openly visible to the public or is
voluntarily disclosed.22
"Public disclosure of private facts" requires a release of personal
information that "would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and is
not of legitimate concern to the public."25 A third party does not violate
this right if the party obtains the personal information from public
sources.24 The U.S. Supreme Court has relied on the First Amendment to
impose stringent constitutional restrictions on state statutes prohibiting
public disclosure of personal information obtained from public sources.2!i
"False light in the public eye" protects against widespread disclosure
of misleading or erroneous information.26 This cause of action often

judiciary, either here or in Germany. As Professor Schwartz noted, "[T]he legislature is to pass
laws that set provisions for every constellation of data use and transmission." Schwartz, supra
note 9, at 691.
19. William Prosser presented this division in Privacy, 48 Cal. L. Rev. 383, 389 (1960).
Prosser went on to adopt these categories in his later'works. See William L. Prosser, Handbook
of the Law of Torts § 117 (4th ed 1971) [hereinafter Prosser, Handbook]; Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 652 (1977). See also Reidenberg, supra note 6, at 221 (making same
division).
20. Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Law of Torts or the Wrongs Which Arise Independently of Contract § 101 at 195 aohn Lewis ed, student ed 1907}. See also Prosser,
Handbook, supra note 19, § 117 at 802 (noting that the right to privacy was coined as the
"right to be let alone" as early as 1890).
21. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B (1977).
22. See Reidenberg, supra note 6, at 222-23 (citations omitted).
23. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 6520 (1977).
24. Duran v. The Detroit News, Inc., 504 N.W.2d 715, 720 (Mich. 1993) ("A cause of action for public disclosure of private facts requires the disclosure of information that would be
highly offensive to a reasonable person and of no legitimate concern to the public, and the
information disclosed must be of a private nature that excludes matters already of public
record or otherwise open to the public eye."); Reidenberg, supra note 6, at 223-24; if. Doe v.
New York City, 21 Media L. Rptr. 1734, 1736 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) ("The constitutional right to
privacy does not extend to matters of public record").
25. Florida Star v. BJ.F., 491 U.s. 524 (1989) (holding unconstitutional a Florida statute
banning publication of a rape victim's name). The Court stated:
Our holding today is limited. We do not hold that truthful publication is automatically constitutionally protected, or that there is no zone of personal privacy
within which the State may protect the individual from intrusion by the press, or
even that a State may never punish publication of the name of a victim of a sexual
offense. We hold only that where a newspaper publishes truthful information which
it has lawfully obtained, punishment may lawfully be imposed, if at all, only when
narrowly tailored to a state interest of the highest order.
Id. at 541.
26. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E (1977).
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overlaps an action for defamation.2'1 Third parties can avoid violating this
right by disseminating only truthful and nonmisleading information or by
limiting dissemination to a small group.
"Appropriation" refers to the unauthorized use of one's name or
likeness for advertising purposes and h.ts come to be called a "right of
publicity.,,28 It involves the a use of a person's name, likeness, or other
indicia of identity, by a third person for purposes of trade, without
consent.29 The right protects against the use of the infonnation by a third
party for advertising and marketing purposes. It ordinarily does not extend
to "the use of a person's identity in news reporting, commentary, entertainment, or in works of fiction or nonfiction." 50
Common-law privacy rights are thus held within natTOW limits. They
do not take something which is public and make it private. With the one
exception of appropriation, they do not turn privacy rights into property
rights. For a privacy right to apply, there must be a clear encroachment on
the personal sphere of the data subject. Privacy limitations have made unnecessary the development of a First Amendment jurisprudence protecting
public comment from privacy claims.sl
Two recent books examine the common law of privacy and seek to
bring new form to parts of it: Raymond Wacks's Personal Infonnation:
Privacy and the LawS2 and Thomas McCarthy's Rights of Publicity and
Privacy.s, Wacks seeks to identifY the core of privacy law. He would
exclude actions for intrusionM and appropriationS5 from a discussion of
27. Prosser, Handbook, supra note 19, § 117, at 813.
28. J. Thomas McCarthy, The Rights of Publicity and Privacy 1-37 (1987 &; Supp. 1994);
Restatement (Third) Unfair Competition § 46 (1995). This change involves more than
designation. A right of publicity is considered a property right which is subject to ownership
and assignment, whereas a right of privacy is considered a personal right that is not subject to
ownership or assignment. Su infra notes 4042 and accompanying text. Two comparative law
treatments of the right of publicity and the corresponding right in Germany have just been
published. Su Horst-Peter Gatling, Personlichkeitsrechte aIs Vermagensrechte (TIibingen:
Mohr, 1994) and Hanns Arno Magold, Personenmerchandlsing: der Schutz der Persona im
Recht der USA und Deutschlands (Frankfurt: Lang, 1994).
29. Restatement (Third) Unfair Competition § 46 (1995); Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 652C (1977).
30. Restatement (Third) Unfair Competition § 47 (1995).
31. The United States Supreme Court considered the relationship between the right of
publicity to First Amendment protections of free speech in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977). In Zacchini, a local television station broadcast as news,
without permission, the entire 15 second act of Zacchini's county fair show as the "human
cannonball." In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that the First Amendment protection of free
speech did not override state publicity law to permit the television station to broadcast the
entire performance as news. Id. at 577-79.
32. Raymond Wacks, Personal Information: Privacy and the Law (1989).
33. McCarthy, supra note 28.
34. See Wacks, supra note 32, at 247-48.
The problems of 'personal information' thus tend to arise when it is sought to use
such information; how it was obtained may then of course be a relevant consideration. But it should be stressed that there is no necessary connection between
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privacy rights. "The essence of my argument," Wacks wrote, "is that at the
heart of the concern about 'privacy' is the use, and especially the misuse,
of 'personal information' about an individual."S6
Wacks's definition of personal information differs significantly from
the EU Draft Directive's definition of personal data. Wacks would use the
following definition: "'Personal information' consists of those facts,
communications, or opinions which relate to the individual and which it
would be reasonable to expect him to regard as intimate or sensitive and
therefore to want to withhold or at least to restrict their collection, use or
circulation." S?
Wacks's conclusion is that "there is no compelling case for applying
the concept of property to 'personal information' as defined in this
book."S6 For Wacks, definitions of personal information should include
two distinct elements: the quality of the information and the individual's
reasonable expectations concerning its use. S9 With respect to quality of information, Wacks has a three-category classification scheme: low sensitivity
(e.g., name), medium sensitivity (e.g., spouse's name), and high sensitivity
(e.g., status as substance abuser).4O
Thomas McCarthy, a well-known intellectual property lawyer, seeks in
his work to distinguish rights of privacy from a right of publicity. He draws
the right of publicity from the action for appropriation, determines that
"[t]he Right of Publicity is a 'property right,'" and concludes that "it is an
intellectual property right along with patents, trademarks, copyrights and
trade secrets."41 This is an important result of his argument, for personal
information would not normally qualify as a patent (it lacks the necessary
novelty), as a trademark (it lacks the necessary use in commerce), as a
copyright (it lacks the necessary originality of expression), or as a trade
secret (it lacks the necessary commercial application). In contrast, rights of
privacy, according to McCarthy, are personal and therefore are not transferable and do not constitute property.42 The Restatement (Third) Unfair Competition largely adopts McCarthy's views.4s When McCarthy argues that the Right of Publicity is an intellectual property right, he does
not argue that the interest of the subject in the information itself is the

the acqUisition of 'personal information' and the individual's interest i[n] not being
observed.
Id.
Id. at 47 & n.75.
Id. at 1-2.
Id. at 26.
Id. at 49.
Wacks, supra note 32, at 24.
Id. at 229.
McCarthy, supra note 28, at 1-7; see also id. § 10.2.
Id. § 10.1.
43. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text (stating that the right to publicity
protects against the use of information by a third party for advertising and marketing
purposes).
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
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substance of that right. The data subject does not "own" the data. Rather,
the data subject owns the right to control certain commercial exploitation
of that information, such as its advertising use.44
Questions from the Common Law
In the United States, it is clear that collecting and disseminating
business information that includes data about individuals does not
automatically trigger rights in the individual. In principle, everyone is free
to collect information from public and private nonconfidential sources and
to use it to comment on the business activities of one's neighbors. Thus no
consequences flow from reporting that Bill Gates is President of Microsoft
and has been since he founded the company in 1975. There is no sensitive
personal information in Wacks's sense and no commercial exploitation in
McCarthy's sense.
This brief review of common-law privacy rights suggests the following
questions about the EU Draft Directive concerning its definition of
personal data and its accommodation of personal data collection and
dissemination in business contexts:

•

•

What sort of interests does the Draft Directive protect? Privacy (i.e.,
sensitivity)? Publicity (i.e., eAllloitation)? Other interests? Are persoDaI.
data property?
How are personal data rights limited to reflect accommodation for
third parties?
II. "PERSONAL INFORMATION" IN THE EU DRAFT DIRECTIVE

Article 2 of the Draft Directive defines "personal data" as "any
information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person ('data
subject')." The explanatory memorandum to the 1992 Commission Draft
noted that the "amended proposal meets Parliament's wish that the definition of 'personal data' should be as general as possible, so as to include
all information concerning an identifiable individual." 45

A. Puhlic Law Orientation
Why did the EU adopt such a far-reaching definition? This definition
was not new to the EU Draft Directive, but is found already in substantially
similar form in the Council of Europe Convention46 and in the OECD
44. The right of publicity is "the inherent right of every human being to control the
commercial use of his or her identity." McCarthy, supra note 28, at 1-37 (emphasis added). But
SCB Anne Wells Branscombs, Who Owns Infonnation? From Privacy to Public Access Passim
(1994) (examining interests in a variety of types of infonnation); Reidenberg, supra note 6, at
226-27 (suggesting that there may be authority for regarding mere circulation of a mailing list
containing a party's name as within that right).
45. 1992 Commission Draft, supra note 1, at 9 (explanatory memorandum).
46. Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Data
Processing of Personal Data, ch. 1, art 2, § a, Eur. T.S. No. 108 (Jan. 28, 1981), reprinted in 20

BUSINESS INFORMATION AND "PERSONAL DATA"

627

Guidelines.47 The Draft Directive and its predecessors likely adopted such
a broad defInition because of their publi~-law rather than private-law
orientation. Public law regulates relations between the state and its members; there is ~ relationship of subordination. States typically enforce public
laws through administrative action. Private law, on the other hand, governs
relations among individuals based on equality and self-determination, in
short, private autonomy. Private parties typically enforce private laws
through civil lawsuits.48 Professor Reidenberg has pointed out that
"European countries view data protection regulation as the realm of
'public law' and define substantive rights and obligations in a way that
reflects a statist vision of governance. . .. The American approach, in
contrast, is founded on principles of private rights and libertarian govemance."49
The Hessian data protection law, generally considered to be the
world's first, concerned only governmental control of data, and to this day
extends no further. 5O When the German Constitutional Court recognized
a quasi-constitutional right to "information self-determination in 1983,.. 51

LL.M. 317 [hereinafter European Convention] ("'Personal data' means any infonnation
relating to an identified or identifiable individual ('data subject').").
47. Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data,
Annex to the Recommendation of the Council of 23rd September 1980 OECD, pt. I, cl.
(l)(b) (1980) [hereinafter Guidelines] ("'Personal data' means any information relating to
an identified or identifIable individual (data subject).").
48. The distinction between public and private law has probably had greater importance
in civil·law jUrisdictions than in common-law ones. Max Weber called it "[o]ne of the most
important distinctions in modem legal theory and practice." 2 Max Weber, Economy and
Society 641 (Guenther Roth Be Claus Wittich eds., 1968); Max Weber on Law in Economy and
Society 41 (Max Rheinstein ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1954). See generally Heinrich Lange Be
Helmut KOhler, BGB Allgemeiner Tell 2-3 (16th ed. 1977); Karl Larenz, Allgemeiner Tell des
deutschen Biirgerlichen Rechts 1 (4th ed. 1977); 1 Hans J. Wolff Be Otto Bachof,
Verwaltungsrecht, Ein Studienbuch § 22 (1974). For a discussion of this distinction from a
common-law perspective, see generally David J. Danelski et al., Public Law, in 13 International
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences 175-S8 (David L. Sills ed., 1968); L. Harold Levinson, The
Public Law/private Law Distinction in the Courts, 57 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1579 (1989). The
distinction is not made consistently eVerywhere. Indeed, single jurisdictions do not make it
uniformly. Observers question its continued validity and even regard it as dangerous. See
Bernd Schilcher, Gesetzgebungstheorie und Privatrecht, in GUnther Winkler Be Bernd
Schilcher, Gesetzgebung: Kritische Oberlegungen zur Gesetzgebungslehre und zur Gesetzgebungstechnik 35, 49 (1981). It remains, nonetheless, a useful distinction.
49. Joel R. Reidenberg, Rules of the Road for Global Electronic Highways: Merging the
Trade and Technical Paradigms, 6 Harv.J.L. Be Tech. 287, 302 (1993).
50. See Hessisches Datenschutzgesetz in der Fassung des Gesetz zur Anderung des Hessischen Datenschutz gesetzes vom 21. Dec. 1988, Gesetz- und Verordnungsblatt fUr das Land
Hessen, I, 309 (1988) as amended Dec. 11, 1988, art. 1 ("The purpose of this Act is to regulate the processing of personal data by public bodies.") (translation in Data Protection in the
European Union: The Statutory Provisions (Spiros Simitis et al. eds" 1994».
51. Judgment of Dec. 15, 1983, Entscheidungen des Bundesverfussungsgerichts, 65 BVerfGE 1; Heribert Prantl, Der Datenschutz zehn Jahre nach dem Volkszahlungsurteil: Unanstandiges fUr unanstandige Leute. Der spate Sieg des ehemaligen Innenrninisters Friedrich
Zimmermann, Siiddeutsche Zeitung, Dec. 16, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, SDZ
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its focus was not on issues of private collection of data.52
What began as an attempt to limit the State, soon turned to concerns
that "Big Brother" might have "very gifted little sisters."55 In Germany
today, while the federal constitution has yet to include an eJ..1>licit right of
privacy, some state constitutions already do.54 For example, the recently
adopted constitution of Thuringia in former East Germany includes a
detailed right of privacy which provides:
Everyone has the right to consideration and protection of his
personality and of his private life. Everyone is entitled to
protection of his personal data. He is entitled to determime the
disclosure and use of such data for himself. These rights may be
limited only by a statute. [W]ithin the terms of statutory law,
everyone has a right to be told what information concerning him
is contained in mes and databases and to view those files and
databases that concern him. 55
The Data Protection Commissioner for the German state of BadenWUrttemberg recently stated that "Data protection ... is the right of every
individual to decide fundamentally for himself, who may Imow what about
him and when.,,56 At least in Germany there would appear to be a move
toward letting individuals pass through the world controlling what is said
about them, the very anathema feared by the New York Court of Appeals
in Roberson.57
"
The Draft Directive leaves no doubt that it wishes to eradicate differences in treatment between data collected and processed by governmental
entities and data collected and processed by private entities. The
explanatory memorandum that accompanied the 1992 Commission Draft
noted that, at the request of the European Parliament, "[t]he amended proposal ... drops the formal distinction between the rules applying in the
public sector and the rules applying in the private sector."58 This produces the "advantage," the commentary noted, "of making it clear that the
protection provided is the same in both the public and the private
sectors.,,~9 One should hardly expect that the transfer of public law concepts and rules to private law relations should occur without difficulty.so

File.

52. Sec Friedheim Hufen, Das Volksziihlungsurteil des Bundesverfussungsgerichts und das
Grundrecht auf infonnationeIle SeIbstbestimmung-eine juristische Antwort auf '1984'?,
1984 Jurlstenzeitung aZ) 1072, 1076. Professor Schwartz regards the decision as having anticipated extension to private relations, even if it did not have direct applicability. See
Schwartz, supra note 9, at 690-91.
53. Hufen, supra note 52, at 1076 ("sehr begabte jiingere Schwestern").
54. See Hans-Hermann Schrader, Datenschutz in den Grundrechtsltatalog, 1994 Computer
und Recht (CR) 427.
55. Id. at 428 (quoting Article 6).
56. Prantl, supra note 51.
57. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 644 N.E. 442, 442-43 (N.Y. 1902).
58. Draft Directive, supra note I, at 2 (officL-tI commentary).
59. Id.; see also id. at 16 (providing comment on Article 7).
60. Cf. Thomas Christian Paefgen, Adrellhandel und Medienprivileg, Computer und
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B. Objects of the Draft Directive
The Draft Directive identifies two principal objects: protection of the
right of privacy and prevention of obstacles to the free flow of information
within the EU. These are apparent in the Draft Directive's title, "On the
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data
and on the Free Movement of Such Data." Article 1(1} states the Draft
Directive's first object: to "protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of
natural persons, and in particular their right to privacy, with respect to the
processing of personal data."61 Article 1(2) provides the second object: .
"Member States shall neither restrict nor prohibit the free flow of personal
data between Member States for reasons connected with the protection afforded under paragraph 1."62
Clearly, privacy is a principal object, and probably the principal object
of the Draft Directive. In this regard, the Draft Directive follows the Convention of the Council of Europe63 and the OECD Guidelines.54 The Draft
Directive limits the scope of the privacy interest to privacy of natural
persons and does not extend the interest to legal entities.55 Nonetheless,
the Draft Directive clearly does not limit the scope of privacy to Wacks's sense of "intimate or sensitive" or to the general contours of the common
law.66
Beyond those two goals, it is not apparent that the Draft Directive
seeks to achieve other objectives. While data protection commentators are
careful to point out that data protection is just one aspect of privacy protection,67 the Draft Directive does not specifY other objects it may seek to
achieve.
The Draft Directive does not go so far as to establish a general right
of property in personal data. Indeed, little in the Draft Directive suggests
development of even a limited right similar to the common-law right of
publicity. By and large the Draft Directive is concerned more with processing
of personal data and less with use of such data, although the Draft

Recht,Jan., 1994, at 14 (discussing the Gennan data protection law).
61. Draft Directive, supra note 1, art. 1(1).
62. Draft Directive, supra note 1, art. 1(2).
63. "The purpose of this convention is to secure in the territory of each Party for every
individual, whatever his nationality or residence, respect for his rights and fundamental
freedoms, and in particular his right to privacy, with regard to autOlnatic processing of
personal data relating to him ('data protection')." European Convention, supra note 46, at 29.
64. "These Guidelines apply to personal data, whether in the public or private sectors,
which, because of the manner in which they are processed, or because of their nature or the
context in which they are used, pose a danger to privacy and individual liberties. " Guidelines
supra note 47, at para. 2.
65. Draft Directive, supra note 1, at art. 1(1). Cf.Judgment of Feb. 8,1994,1994 Computer und Recht (CR) 396-98 (discussing the personality right of an enterprise under the
Gennan Civil Code).
66. See supra text accompanying notes 16-38.
67. See, e.g., David H. Flaherty, Protecting Privacy in SUlveillance Societies xiii-xiv (1989).
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Directive defmes processing to include use such as dissemination. It gives
data subjects certain rights of notification about processing, certain rights
in how that processing is conducted, but few rights in how personal data is
used. The most notable exception is Article 14(b) which indirectly gives
data subjects the right to prevent personal data from being used for "the
purposes of direct marketing.,,68

III. FREEDoM OF DATA COLLECTION AND DISSEMINATION
The Draft Directive is not directly applicable law. Instead, it constitutes a direction to Member States to enact laW.69 Thus, the Draft
Directive can accommodate competing interests directly by mandating
certain rules and indirectly by permitting Member States, in their own
legislation, to make such accommodation. Article 5 recognizes this explicitly stating, "Member States shall, witllin the limits of the provisions of
this Chapter, determine more precisely may more precisely the conditions
under which the processing of personal data is lawful." 70

A. Regulation Regime
The Draft Directive mandates comprehensive control of processing of
personal data by government and private parties alike. Article 6 imposes
requirements of data quality, including accuracy and limitations on purpose and time of retention. Article 7 restricts the permissible grounds for
processing data. Article 8 prohibits the processing of sensitive data, such as
tllat relating to racial or ethnic origin. Articles 10 and 11 require
notification be given to the data subject. Articles 12 and 13 grant data
subjects rights regarding access to the data. Articles 14 and 15 grant data
subjects rights to object to processing of data. Additional issues addressed
by the Draft Directive include requirements of levels of security (Article
17); obligation to notify the supervisory authority of processing (Articles
18-21); judicial remedies, liability, and penalties (Articles 23 and 25); and
limitations on transborder transmission of personal data (Article 25).
Focus on Regulation
The Draft Directive focuses principally on the individual's interest in
privacy and on the accompanying regulatory regime designed to secure
that interest. When the Draft Directive addresses issues of privacy and
regulation, typically it does so in precise terms in rules tllat it mandates
Member States to adopt. When, on the other hand, it addresses issues of
freedom, typically it does so in less precise and even indefinite terms in
68. Draft Directive, supra note 1, art. 14(b).
69. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 9,
Treaties Establishing the European Communities, 171-505. ("A directive shall be binding in its
entirety, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but
shall leave to the national authorities the choice ofform and methods.").
70. Draft Directive, supra note 1, art. 5.
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authorizations that may pennit; but do not always require, Member States
to make accommodations for that freedom. Insofar as these accommodations become significant, this lack. of clear direction may lead to an
undesirable lack. of harmony in the laws of Member States.
If the Draft Directive only imposed specific prohibitions, its failure to
address freedom of information collection and distribution more fully
might not be especially troubling. However, the Draft Directive is not so
limited. Its technique is to mandate prohibition of all processing of personal data that it does not specifically allow. While the American rule
permits everything that is not prohibited, the EU rule prohibits everything
that is not permitted.'l Consequently, the Draft Directive'~ failure to adequately address freedom issues almost necessarily affects those freedoms
negatively.
Although the EU is unlikely to reverse itself on the application of a
general rule prohibiting information collection and dissemination, one
may still question its wisdom. A general rule of prohibition coupled with
limited authorizations makes more sense when there is some reason to
discourage the underlying activity generally. That might be the case, for
example, where the underlying activity is usually regarded as undesirable,
such as restraints of trade, or where the actor affected is to be restricted,
such as a government of limited powers.'2 That goal does not, however,
seem to be present in nongovernmental collection and dissemination of
information. A free society depends on a free flow of information. Article
10 of the European Convention on Human Rights explicitly guarantees the
right to receive and distribute the information. The EU Draft Directive, in
adopting a general rule of prohibition, seems to challenge those tenets, at
least as applied to personal data.

B. Scope of Application
Article 3. Scope. Article 3 provides two relevant explicit limitations on
the scope of the Draft Directive. One prevents application of the Draft
Directive to manual, noncomputer data processing,'S and the other
prevents application to processing by natural persons.'4 These tw'O
limitations do not seem likely, however, to provide important accommoda-

71. This is obvious ammunition for the many series ofjokes based on national characters,
e.g., in England, everything is pennitted unless prohibited, in Germany everything is prohibited unless permitted, and in France everything is prohibited, but nobody pays any attention.
The technique is not, however, foreign to Member State law. See infra note 79 and accompanying text.
72. For example, German antitrust law adopted a general rule of prohibition with extensive opportunities for exemptions and permissions rather than a general abuse control.
David J. Gerber, Constitutionalizing the Economy: German Nee-liberalism, Competition Law
and the "New" Europe, 42 Am. J. Compo L, 25, 64-66 (1994). See also Rudolf Isay, Die
Geschichte der Kartellgesetzgebungen 74-78, 88-90 (1955); Maxeiner, Policy and Methods,
supra note 12, at 18.
73. See Draft Directive, supra note'I, art. 3(l}.
74. See id. art. 3(2).
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tions for freedom of information collection and distribution.
Paragraph 1 of Article 3 provides that the Draft Directive shall apply
to processing "wholly or partly by automatitc means, and . . . otheIWise
than by automatic means of personal data which form part of a file or is
intended to form part of a file."75 This provides a safe haven for personal
data collected incidentally to some other information-collecting activity, so
long as the principal data collecting is not computerized. In terms of the
Microsoft example, a newspaper clipping file that is not entered into a
computer system and that contains personal data about Mr. Gates would
not be subject to the Draft Directive. The practical effect of this provision
may be less significant than anticipated as data collectors shift more
information to electronic files through scanning, imaging, and data entry.
Paragraph 2 of Article 3 provides that the Draft Directive shall not
apply "to the processing of personal data by a natural person in the course
ofa purely personal or household activity." 76 According to a statement for
entry in the minutes accompanying the Draft Directive: "[T]he Council
and Commission consider the expression 'purely personal or household
activity' must not make it possible to exclude from the scope of the
directive the processing of personal data by a natural person, where such
data are disclosed not to one or more persons but to an indeterminate
number of persons."" Since the exemption does not apply to corporate
entities, it can have little effect in protecting the free flow of business
information.
Arlicie 7. Ground for processing required. Article '7 establishes the basic
rule of prohibition: "Member States shall provide that personal data may
be processed onl:y if' one of six conditions is met 78 Member States are to
prohibit "processing," defined by Article 2(b) to include essentially any
operation concerned with personal data, unless the processing satisfies one
of the particular justifications enumerated in Article 7 or is otheIWise exempted by the Draft Directive. Because Article 2(b) defines "processing"
broadly, Article 7 is widely applicable. Article 14 provides, in a separate
mandatory rule, that with respect to cases referred to in Article 7(e) and
7(£). "Member States shall grant the data subject the right ... to object at
any time on compelling legitimate grounds relating to his particular
situation to the processing of data relating to him," and that when there is .
79
a "justified objection." the controller shall cease the processing.
Most private party processing of personal data would be permissible
so
only if Article 7(a). 7(b). or 7(f) is satisfied. Article 7 (a) permits

'75. Id. art. 3(1).
76. Id. art. 3(2).
7'7. Statements for Entry in the Minutes Accompanying the Draft Directive, 4730/95
Annex 1 at 3 [hereinafter Statements for Entry].
78. Draft Directive, supra note I, art. 7 (emphasis added).
'79. For Article 14, see infra notes 101.()2 and accompanying text.
80. The other provisions are: '7(c), to comply with law; 7(d), to protect the infonnation
subject; and '7(e), in the public interest or carried out in exercise of public authority. Draft
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processing when the data subject has given consent8l Article 7(b) allows
processing "necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data
subject is a party or in order to take steps at the request of the data subject
prior to entering into a contract"82 Article 7(f) permits processing
"necessary for ·the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by the third party or parties to whom the data are disclosed,
except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental
rights and freedoms of the data subject. nss
While the operative legal concepts of Article 7(a) (collection with
consent) and Article 7 (b) (in preparation or performance of a contract)
are fairly definite, those of Article 7(f) are considerably more indefinite.
The Draft Directive itself offers scant guidance in determining under
Article 7 (f) what interests are legitimate and when they might be
"overridden by the interests ... of the data subject"84 The explanatory
memorandum to the 1992 Commission Draft offered only a bit more
guidance when it stated that "this balance-of.interest clause is likely to
concern very different kinds of processing, such as direct-mail marketing
and the use of data which are already a matter of public record."BS Data
protection authorities might seize on this comment as an authorization of
general collection and distribution of public information.
Article 9. Journalism exemption. Article 9 provides that "Member States
shall provide exemptions ... for the processing of personal data carried
out solely for journalistic purposes or the purpose of artistic or literary
expression which prove necessary to reconcile the right to privacy with the
rules governing freedom of expression." This direction to the Member
States to create exemptions for journalism is the clearest example in the
Draft Directive of an attempt to balance protection of privacy and freedom
of information.86 The Draft .Directive itself, however, gives no clear
direction as to what the nature and scope of these exemptions ought to be.
As an effort to balance competing interests of privacy protection and
freedom of information, the Article is subject to criticism. On the one
hand, it may be criticized as being too broad, since it gives Member States
a broad authorization to exempt journalistic activity from the constraints of

Directive, supra note 1.
81. ld. art. 7(a).
82. ld. art. 7(b).
83. ld. art. 7(f).
84. SimiIarly, Article 6(1) (b) provides that data must be "collected for specified, explicit
and legitimate purposes and used in a way compatible with those purposes." leI. art. 6(I)(b).
85. 1992 Commission Draft, supra note 1, at 4 (explanatory memorandum).
86. The preamble, 37th recital, expressly recognizes freedom of information: "Whereas
the processing of personal data for purposes of journalism or for purposes of artistic
expression, in particular in the audioVisual field, should qua1ify for exemption from the
reqUirements of certain provisions of this Directive insofar as this is necessary to reconcile the
fundamental rights of individuals with freedom of information and notably the right to
receive and impart information, as guaranteed in particular in Article 10 of the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms."
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data protection. On the other hand, it may be criticized as being too
narrow, since it limits that authori7a.tion to activities conducted "solely for
journalistic purposes." Indeed, both texts may suggest the opposite.
While the interest of free expression is particularly strong in the case
of journalism, so too is the individual's interest in privacy. Because of the
opportunities for broad dissemination, it is especially likely that in the case
of journalism, individuals would be interested in, for example, a right to
correction.
On the other hand, limiting exemptions to journalism leaves many
activities that should fall under freedom of information protection
uncovered. The usual definit!~n of journalism is limited to print and
broadcast media.S? But freedom of expression is not a monopoly of
journalism. The information highway that has led to the felt need for data
protection laws has created new opportunities for communication which
share aspects of traditional journalism or simply traditional free speech.
For example, is there a basis for treating on-demand, on·line information
providers differently than the publications some of them carry?88
Data Content and Securitr
Article 6. Data quality. Article 6 of the Draft Directive mandates a
number of requirements for data qualitr. Article 6(1) (c) provides that
personal data collected must be "adequate, relevant and not excessive in
relation to the purposes for which they are collected andj or for which
they are further processed."S9 Article 6(1) (d) provides that data must be
"accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date; every reasonable step
must be taken to ensure that data which are inaccurate or incomplete,
having regard to the purposes for which they were collected or for which
they are further processed, are erased or rectified."90 A practical infirmity
of the provision is that it fails to recognize adequately the inchoate nature
of data collection. It assumes a focused purpose that collectors of informa·
tion may not always have. Business and science professionals sometimes
capture information before being certain of its accuracy or utility. Only
after using such information may the user determine its accuracy or
completeness.
Article 8. Sensitive data. Article 8(1) of the Draft Directive requires that
Member States prohibit processing of certain special categories of data,
such as racial or ethnic information and political or religious beliefS.91
Article 8(2) then requires Member States to permit that processing in five

87. The title of Article 9 is "Processing of personal data and freedom of expression."
Directive, supra note 1, art. 9.
88. In Germany, there have been attempts to distinguish traditional journalism from
advertising-oriented journalism, including supermarket newsletters. See Paefgen, supra note 60,
at 17.
89. Draft Directive, supra note 1, art. 6(I)(c).
90. Id. art. 6(I)(d).
91. Id. art. 8(1).
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specified instances.92 One of these instances, (e), provides that processing
shall be permitted when "the processing relates to data which are
manifestly made public by the data subject ... .n Were this exception a
general exemption to the Draft Directive, and not just to sensitive data, the
impact of the Draft Directive on collection and dissemination of business
information involving individuals would be much reduced. Article 8(3)
requires Member States to permit processing of data required for medicai
purposes and processed by medical personne1.93 Finally, Article 8(4)
permits Member States, on grounds of important public interest, to lay
down additional exemptions. 94
Article 17. Security of processing. Article 17 mandates that Member States
impose requirements on security of processing. While a common-law perspective suggests asking why these requirements are imposed in all cases,
Article 17 implicitly recognizes third party interests in processing. The
Article uses limiting words such as "appropriate" and "sufficient" to qualify
its requirements, acknowledging that the full range of security protections
used by a processor need not necessarily be used in every instance.
Data Subject Rights
Articles 12 and 13. Right of access. Article 12 of the Directive requires
that Member States provide information subjects with wide-ranging rights
to obtain information about personal data held by others. Those rights
include having information corrected when incorrect95 Article 13 allows
Member States to make exceptions to those rights of access (e.g., national
security).96 Requirements that data collectors open their files to
individuals on whom they collect data draw the same objections as
proposals to impose uniform data quality standards. A practical infirmity of
this Article is that it anticipates developments in database design that are
not yet fully implemented. Even companies that make it their business to
license information to others may have difficulties in complying with such
laws. Under these provisions, Member States may adopt laws that do not
recognize the difficulties of searching files. For example, not all computer
files are searchable for every bit of data found in them. Quebec, which
recently adopted its own data protection law, deals with this problem in
part by restricting the applicability of the law generally to files on particular
individuals. It does not extend the law to personal information held
incidental to other files. 97 The EU may take the same approach as

92. rd. art. 8(2). The five instances are: (a) consent of data subject; (b) controllers'
compliance with employment law; (ct protect data subject in specified situations; (d) by
certain organizations regarding their members; and (e) data subject has made data public or
processing is necessary to exercise legal claims.
93. rd. art. 8(3).
94. Draft Directive, supra note 1, art 8(4).
95. Draft Directive, supra note 1, art. 12(2).
96. rd. art. 13.
97. See Raymond Doray, The Act Respecting the Protection of Personal Information in
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Qu6bec. According to the Commission and Council in a statement for
entry in the minutes accompanying the Draft Directive, "[I]n line with the
current defmtion in Article 2, the Draft Directive covers only filing systems,
not files.,,98
Articles 10 and 11. Infonnation to be given to data subject. Articles 10(1)
and 11 (1) of the Draft Directive require that the controller of personal
data inform the data subject of disclosure of the data to a third party except in cases where the data subject already knows.99 Again, as with other
provisions of the Draft Directive, the Article is fairly e>"'Plicit about what
Member States must include in their laws. Here, the Article lists particulars
of what must be contained in the notification.
Whether notification is required before data is collected or when it is
first distributed is of substantial significance for business. While demand
for information is practically instantaneous, collection of information is
not. While some information can be collected rapidly, some can be
collected only over time. If, for example, a business has not been collecting
records of suits and judgments generally, it will not be able to report with.
confidence that there are none when asked by someone who wants to do
business with that party. Consent given at the moment of distribution is
practically useless for the transaction immediately contemplated. New
business start-ups may well be disadvantaged and slowed because of a lack
of current information.
Article 11 (2) provides that Article 11 (1), which requires disclosure of
the fact of processing to the data subject, shall not apply where "the
provision of information proves impossible or involves a disproportionate
effort, or if recording or disclosure is expressly laid down by law.n1OO
Article 11 (2) gives as examples of such instances, s1A.tistical purposes,
historical and scientific research, but does not limit its exception to these
cases. How the Member States implement this exception is important from
a business perspective. A business that routinely disseminates personal data
might choose to locate its processing operations in a Member State that
exempts its operations from that prior notification requirement rather than
settle in a Member State where notification is demanded in every such
case. Such a result, of course, runs counter to the Draft Directive's goal of
achieving a Single European Market.
Articles 14. Right to object. Article 14 provides that Member States, at
least in the cases of Article 7(e) and (f), shall grant data subjects the right

the Private Sector: The Countdovm is on for all Companiesl 3, Memorandum prepared and
distributed by the Lavery, de Billy law finn (1993) (on file with the University of Iowa College
of Law library) ("We have every reason to believe that the enterprise which neither keeps nor
files Its documents so that they may be traced in relation to the identify of a natural person
and which Is not asked to make a decision with regard to this person does not compile a file
on others."). The statute, however, does not clearly require this interpretation.
98. Statements for Entry, supra note 77, at '1. See Maxeiner, supra note 1.
99. Draft DirectiVe, supra note 1, arts. 10(1), 11 (1).
100. Id. art. 11(2).
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to object at any time "on compelling legitimate grounds" to the processing
of data on them. 10l It further provides that where there is a justified
objection to the data, the processing shall no longer include that data.
Moreover, Article 14(b) provides that the controller must ensure that the
opportunity to object has been expressly offered to the data subject before
the controller discloses personal data to third parties or uses that'data for
the purposes of direct marketing.
The right to object in Article 14 of the Draft Directive is less farreaching than was its counterpart in Article 15 of the 1992 Commission
Draft For example, in the current version, Member States are required to
provide a right to object only in the cases of Article 7(e) and (f); the 1992
Commission Draft had foreseen the right to object in the case of every
provision of Article 7. 102 Further, the Draft Directive now requires a
"compelling" ground for the objection; before it did not In the event that
the objection is justified, the Draft Directive requires merely that "the
processing instigated by the controller may no longer involve those data";
the 1992 Commission Draft had required that "the controller shall cease
the processing." These limitations lessen the burdens imposed by the Draft
Directive on business information providers.
Government Notification
Articles 18 and 19. Article 18 mandates that Member States include in
their laws an obligation to notifY a supervisory authority before carrying
out any automatic processing or set of processing operations intended to
serve a single or related purposes.10S Article 19 provides in detail what
facts must be stated in the notification. Article 18(2) provides for situations
in which Member States may simplify or exempt categories of processing
which "are unlikely ... to affect adversely the rights and freedoms of data
subjects."
CONCLUSION

The Council, in its Draft Directive, only begins the process of drafting
data protection legislation consistent with the public's interest in a free
flow of business information. It is certainly welcome that the Common
Position more clearly acknowledges the importance of freedom of
information that did the Commission's own proposals to the Council. It is
also welcome that the Common Position eases some of the burdens
imposed on information providers by the Draft Directive. Still, the
Common Position, even if the European Parliament approves it without
change, will leave much work for national legislatures in implementing the
Draft Directive. Common law experiences suggest that in fashioning that
new legislation, national legislatures should find compelling the public's

101. Id. art. 14(a).
102. See supra notes 78-85 and accompanying text for a discussion of Article 7.
103. Draft Directive, supra note 1, art 18(1).
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interest in a free flow of infonnation. They ought not take a cramped view
of the freedom of infonnation that restricts its beneficiaries to the
traditional media. They should take into account the nature of the
infonnation involved, its source, and its intended use, before imposing
heavy burdens on those who collect and disseminate it.

